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Abstract: 
 
The effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing via large-scale asset 
purchase programs has been studied extensively.  This paper distinguishes itself by 
examining the effectiveness of the federal funds rate as the U.S. monetary policy tool before, 
during and after the Great Recession of 2007-09.  The zero lower bound came into play one 
year into the Great Recession, having dropped 425 basis points from the cycle peak.  We 
begin by evaluating using the Wald test for Granger causality and the Johansen test for 
cointegration presence whether or not the changes in the federal funds rate affected the term 
structure of Treasury securities.  Given that equity markets are sensitive to changes in 
interest rates, we next examine the impact of the federal funds rate changes on the level and 
volatility of the U.S. stock market. Our analysis reveals that the Fed policy of lowering the 
federal funds rate during the Great Recession was effective, resulting in changes in the 
Treasury term structure during but not after the Great Recession.  Additionally, the Fed’s 
policy actions influenced the stock market and its volatility during the Great Recession only.   
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1.  Introduction  
 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research determined that a recession occurred in the U.S. between December 2007 
and June 2009.  Given the historic severity of the length, depth and breadth of the 
decline and subsequent recovery – the worst economic performance since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s – economists have dubbed this period the Great Recession 
(GR).  Once the severity of this downturn became clear in 2008 U.S. policy makers 
were quick to use both fiscal and monetary policies to inject confidence and 
liquidity into the rapidly declining financial system and economy. The Fed’s use 
later that year of not only substantial reductions in the Fed funds target rate but also 
quantitative easing via the purchase of $1.7 trillion in assets was strong evidence of 
an expansionary monetary policy of unprecedented magnitude. The $787 billion 
stimulus package passed in the early days of the Barak Obama administration is but 
one example of a very expansionary fiscal policy.  
 
While fiscal policy tried to prop up the financial institutions and the economy 
directly by giving them immediate rescue funding, monetary policy was geared 
more toward providing lower interest rates and almost unlimited liquidity for 
financial institutions such as commercial banks, mortgage companies and 
investment banks.  The primary tool used to provide liquidity was known as the 
large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) program, also called quantitative easing (QE).  
Rather than a single event, QE was instituted in four phases.  The first action, known 
as QE1, began in December 20082.  Unlike normal Fed policy that limits asset 
purchases to Treasury bills, QE1 involved the targeted purchase of agency 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and long-term Treasury securities as well.  
During QE1 the Fed accumulated over $1.7 trillion in mortgages and Treasuries.  
The next phase, QE2, occurred well after the official trough of the Great Recession 
of June 2009, lasting between November 2010 and June 2011.  During this period, 
the Fed purchased an additional $600 billion in Treasury securities.  The third phase 
involved a change in the average duration of the Fed’s asset holdings known as 
Operation Twist, beginning in September 2011 and ending in December 2012.  The 
Fed’ actions extended the average bond maturity of its asset holdings from short 
term to long term yet did not in itself add any new monetary base to the economy.  
Since short-term rates as represented by the target range had hit the zero lower 
(ZLB) bound nearly three years earlier and could no longer lower rates in general, 
the Fed had to achieve lower intermediate and long rates by directly injecting 
liquidity into the markets for those securities. The fourth program, ongoing as of this 
2 Prior to QE the Fed had changed the composition of its portfolio to provide short-term liquidity to 
financial firms and markets.  This policy action occurred in the late summer of 2008.  QE was then 
announced in November 25, 2008 but instituted in December 2008.  Due to the unusually unresponsive 
economic recovery, the Fed instituted a series of QE programs for over 5 years.  
                                                 
The Effectiveness of the Federal Funds Rate as the U.S. Monetary Policy Tool Before, 
                                        During and After the Great Recession                                       39    
 
writing, was QE3 which began in September 2012.3  Initially, a monthly purchase of 
$40 billion in mortgage-backed securities was planned but the amount gradually 
increased to $85 billion.4  
 
In the early days of the financial turmoil, beginning with mortgage market troubles 
in August 2007, the Fed responded with a reduction in the FF by 50 basis points in 
September, 25 basis points in October, and another 25 in December 2007 as seen in 
Table 1.  The first reductions in the FF during the GR were in January 2008 when 
the Fed, in two moves, lowered the target by a total of 125 basis points. March and 
April of 2008 combined for another reduction in the FF by 100 basis points, to a 
2.00% target.  The reason for the actions was not, however, the GR since no one at 
the time knew the recession had begun. The Federal Open Market Committee’s 
2008 statements through April of that year speak of a weakened outlook for 
economic output, but the statements in April, June and August report expanding 
economic activity.5  Clearly the drops in the FF that occurred through April 2008 
were aimed solely at the financial weakness rather than output.  It was not until a 
100 basis point drop in the FF over two meetings in October 2008 that the FOMC 
explicitly recognized a marked slowing of economic activity.  The ZLB was 
achieved in December 2008, when the FOMC statement announced the creation of a 
target range of 0.0-0.25% rather than a specific rate, based on weak output, labour 
markets, and credit conditions.  The target remains at the ZLB as of this writing, in 
the third quarter of 2014, an unprecedented low rate for an unprecedented length of 
time.    
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Thornton (2013) and Fawley and Neely (2013) provide a detailed chronology of the Fed QE 
announcements and FOMC minutes releases.   
4 Tapering of QE3 was first mentioned by Ben Bernanke on June 19, 2013 but was not instituted until 
January 2014 when a monthly purchase reduction of $10 billion began. As of this writing, the FOMC 
appears ready to end QE3 in October 2014, assuming no unforeseen crises arising. 
5 To access all of the FOMC’s statements, transcripts, and other materials for 2008, go to its website:  
http://federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm.   
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html 
 
 
These monetary actions are of great interest to both analysts and policy makers and 
have been studied in depth.  We focus our attention instead on the Federal Reserve’s 
use of federal funds target rate/range (FFR) to influence economic outcomes. In 
particular, this paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the overall 
effectiveness of the Fed's federal funds rate policy before, during and after the GR 
by examining its impact on the term structure of Treasury securities and the stock 
market.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A vast majority of the work on the effect of Fed policy actions during the GR 
focuses on LSAPs; thus we will set out the state of the literature on the effect of 
these purchases on the economy as a foundation on which to build our analysis of 
the effectiveness of the federal funds rate policy during the overlapping timeframe. 
Table 1. Effective Dates of Federal Funds Rate Changes 
Effective Date When Occurred Fed Funds Target Rate 
June 29, 2006 Not in the Study Period 5.25% 
September 18, 2007 
Before the Great 
Recession 
4.75 % 
October 31, 2007 4.50% 
December 11, 2007 4.25% 
January 22, 2008 
During the Great 
Recession 
3.50% 
January 30, 2008 3.00% 
March 18, 2008 2.25% 
April 30, 2008 2.00% 
October 8, 2008 1.50% 
October 29, 2008 1.00% 
December 16, 2008 (QE1) to 
the present 
Target changed to a Range of 
0% – 0.25% 
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The impact of the LSAP program on major macroeconomic variables has been 
studied extensively using a macroeconomic modelling approach.  For example 
Chen, Curida and Ferrero (2012) used a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model to show that GDP grew by less than a third of a percentage point and 
inflation did not change after QE2.  Baumeister and Benati (2010) used a Bayesian 
time-varying parameter structural VAR model, concluding that unconventional 
monetary policy actions such as the LSAP averted the risk of deflation and a 
collapse in output in both the U.S. and the U.K.  Mora (2014) showed that the LSAP 
lowered consumer loan rates such as mortgage refinancing and auto loans but the 
strength of the pass-through to banks was weaker than the previous periods.  Ng and 
Wright (2013), while surveying the business cycle’s facts, showed through a time-
varying VAR simulation that a ZLB can induce a case of non-linearity in business 
cycle analysis. They concluded, however, that the length of time was too short to 
render a meaningful interpretation.  
 
There is as well a large volume of studies utilizing an event-study approach to 
examine the impact of the LSAP on the interest rates.   For example, Chen, Curida 
and Ferrero (2012) provided a summary6 of various event-study results that are done 
by Hamilton and Wu (2010), D'Amico and King (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011a), 
Neely (2012), Swanson (2011), etc.  Their overall, and unanimous, conclusion was 
that the LSAP program did lower the 10-year Treasury yield by a statistically 
significant amount ranging between -13 to -107 basis points.   
 
In addition to Treasury securities, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
evaluated the impact of the LSAP on the interest rates of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) and corporate securities during QE1 and QE2. Their analysis showed that 
the Fed's purchase of MBSs and corporate securities during QE1 did lower their 
respective yields.  However, during QE2 when Treasury securities were purchased 
by the Fed, Treasury yields fell more than the yields on MBSs and corporate 
securities.   Swanson (2011) examined the cumulative effects of six Fed 
announcements during the Operation Twist period and concluded that they 
decreased long-term agency and corporate bond yields but by a smaller amount than 
Treasury yields.  Additional studies done by Swanson (2013) and Swanson and 
Williams (2013) showed the same conclusion that the news of QE1 and QE2 
affected the Treasury securities term structure by lowering yields on Treasury 
securities with maturity greater than a year.  Nellis (2013) found that there was a 
stronger and more effective announcement impact in lowering long-term interest 
rates during QE1 than during QE2 and QE3. Foerster and Cao (2013), on the other 
hand, argued that expectations of upcoming LSAP announcements have more 
important impact on the interest rates than the actual announcements.   
6 Kozicki, Santor, and Suchanek (2011) and Foerster and Cao (2013) also provide a good summary of 
research results on this topic. 
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There are additional studies that employed methodologies other than the 
macroeconomic modelling and event-study approaches to examine the impact of the 
LSAP program on interest rates.  For example, Kozicki, Santor, and Suchanek 
(2011) and Stroebel and Taylor (2009) employed time series data to examine the 
impact of the LSAPs on interest rate spreads.  While the former found the Fed's 
purchases of mortgage-backed securities decreased long-term interest rates, the latter 
found insignificant evidence of that when the option-adjusted spread was examined.   
On the other hand, using an affine term structure with the ZLB, Hamilton and Wu 
(2012) concluded that a maturity swap of short-term Treasuries for long-term 
Treasuries could result in the reduction of the 10-year Treasury rate by 13 basis 
points.  In summary, these various types of studies on the LSAP program show that 
it had an appreciable effect on long-term interest rates and spreads. 
 
3. Data and Methodologies 
 
The Fed has used the FFR as its primary monetary policy tool for over 5 decades, 
settling on the zero lower bound as its ultimate weapon against the worst economic 
crisis in eighty years. We propose to study what role the policy played during the 
time periods surrounding the Great Recession.  We investigate the following 
regarding this aspect of FFR actions: did movements in the target affect the term 
structure of Treasury securities? Did the movements in the target impact the stock 
market and its volatility as well? And lastly, what are the policy implications of the 
FF as a monetary policy tool, post-GR?   
 
3.1 Time Periods of Study and Data 
 
We use the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank's weekly (Wednesday) data on the 
FFTR, all interest rates of Treasury securities, S&P 500 index and the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange's VIX index by defining the start of the Great Recession as 
the first Wednesday of January 2008 that ends on the last Wednesday of June 2009, 
a total of 18 months7.  As shown in Table 2, we then define the pre-GR period as the 
18 months preceding the GR from the first Wednesday of July 2006 to the last 
Wednesday of December 2007.  Similarly, the post-GR period is defined as the 18 
7 Given that the National Bureau of Economic Research announces a recession period by the month and 
quarter of turning points, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis suggests and explains 3 ways to define 
the daily start and end of a recession.  The first way is to use the midpoint method of picking the 15th 
day of the month; the second way is the trough method that uses the first day of the month; and the 
third way is to use the peak method of picking the first day of the following month.  We use the peak 
method in this paper because it reflects a peak to a trough better.  Also, see 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/USRECD.txt 
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months from the first Wednesday of July 2009 and the last Wednesday of December 
2010.  
 
The FFR was changed 3 times during the pre-GR period, 7 times during the GR, and 
none during the post-GR period as shown in Table 1.  While the change during the 
pre-GR period was a modest 100 basis points, the Federal Reserve was quite 
aggressive in lowering the rate by 425 basis points, reaching into the zero lower 
bound, during the GR period. For this analysis we collected the federal funds rate 
(FFR), U.S. Treasury securities with a maturity of 1 month (DGS1M), 3 months 
(DGS3M), 6 months (DGS6M), 1 year (DGS1), 2 years (DGS2), 3 years (DGS3), 5 
years (DGS5), 7 years (DGS7), 10 years (DGS10), 20 years (DGS20), and 30 years 
(DGS30) along with the logarithmic value of S&P 500 stock index (SP500) and VIX 
index for the three sub-periods. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the FFR 
and all sub-components of the Treasury term structure.  The level of interest rates 
during each of the 3 periods clearly shows the downward trend, reflecting fully the 
intended goal of the Federal Reserve's policy tool during these periods.  However, 
their volatility as measured by either the standard deviation or the range indicates 
extraordinary situation that was taking place during the GR. The FFR, being a policy 
variable, should show smaller volatility in normal times than other short-term 
interest rates that are determined by the market force.  This observation was borne 
out during the pre- and post-GR periods as shown in the second and third columns 
of Table 3.  For example, the range of 1.09% for FFR is smaller than that of 2.58% 
for DGS1M during the pre-GR period.  Likewise, the range of 0.13% for FFR is 
smaller than that of 0.16% for DGS1M during the post-GR period.   However, 
during the GR, the FFR range of 4.14% is higher than the DGS1M range of 3.26% 
and those of all other interest rates of the Treasury term structure.  This indicates in 
part that the Treasury market responded more calmly to the Federal Reserve's policy 
actions during the GR than the pre- or post-GR periods. 
          Table 2. The Study Periods and Number of Weeks in Each Period 
 Start Date End Date Number of Weeks 
Pre Great Recession 
(Pre GR) July 5, 2006 
December 26, 
2007 78 
Great Recession 
(GR) January 2, 2008 June 24, 2009 78 
Post Great Recession 
(Post GR) July 1, 2009 
December 29, 
2010 79 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Federal Funds Rate and Each Member Rate in Treasury Term Structure (in %) 
Pre-GR FFR DGS1M DGS3M DGS6M DGS1 DGS2 DGS3 DGS5 DGS7 DGS10 DGS20 DGS30 
Mean 5.10 4.61 4.67 4.80 4.71 4.53 4.49 4.54 4.59 4.68 4.93 4.85 
Std. Dev. 0.28 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.41 0.35 0.27 0.21 0.20 
Range 1.09 2.58 2.23 2.05 2.09 2.24 2.18 1.81 1.57 1.27 0.96 0.9 
Minimum 4.21 2.66 2.95 3.25 3.17 2.96 2.99 3.33 3.58 3.92 4.4 4.36 
Maximum 5.3 5.24 5.18 5.3 5.26 5.2 5.17 5.14 5.15 5.19 5.36 5.26 
Count 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
             
GR FFR DGS1M DGS3M DGS6M DGS1 DGS2 DGS3 DGS5 DGS7 DGS10 DGS20 DGS30 
Mean 1.38 0.93 1.02 1.26 1.43 1.68 1.97 2.54 2.97 3.46 4.22 4.12 
Std. Dev. 1.20 0.92 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.71 0.65 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.54 
Range 4.14 3.26 3.23 3.21 2.95 2.33 2.3 2.25 2.18 2.08 1.92 2.18 
Minimum 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.36 0.74 1 1.42 1.72 2.15 2.91 2.59 
Maximum 4.24 3.27 3.24 3.42 3.31 3.07 3.3 3.67 3.9 4.23 4.83 4.77 
Count 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
             
Post-GR FFR DGS1M DGS3M DGS6M DGS1 DGS2 DGS3 DGS5 DGS7 DGS10 DGS20 DGS30 
Mean 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.35 0.79 1.23 2.09 2.77 3.31 4.11 4.28 
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.35 0.46 0.47 0.41 0.36 0.30 
Range 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.29 0.88 1.28 1.61 1.63 1.52 1.33 1.2 
Minimum 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.35 0.51 1.13 1.76 2.43 3.31 3.6 
Maximum 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.33 0.51 1.23 1.79 2.74 3.39 3.95 4.64 4.8 
Count 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
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3.2 Methodologies 
 
We first utilize the Granger causality model and the vector autoregressive model to 
examine the impact of the federal funds rate on the Treasury term structure. Then we 
estimate an ordinary least squares regression model to examine the impact of the 
Treasury term structure on the S&P 500 stock index and VIX stock market volatility 
index.  
 
3.2.1 Causality and Cointegration of the Federal Funds Rate and Term 
Structure 
 
In order to examine the impact of the federal funds rate changes on the Treasury 
term structure, we first employ the Granger causality test and then, the cointegration 
test.  The Granger causality test can show if the change in FFR has Granger-caused 
the member interest rates of the Treasury term structure.  The FFR, being the policy 
variable, the casual relationship can run only uni-directionally from FFR changes to 
the term structure.  Modifying the model used by Carpenter et al. (2013), we 
propose to use Equation (1) to check the presence of Granger causality: 
 
1 1
n m
t i t i j t j t
i j
R FFR Rα β δ ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑        (1) 
 
where Rt is the member interest rates of the Treasury term structure; FFRt is the 
federal funds rate; , iα β  and jδ  are regression coefficients; and tε  is the error term.  
We use n = m = 5 due to the nature of the weekly data used8.  The Wald test statistic 
is calculated via Stata to test if all iβ 's are simultaneously equal to zero. If this null 
hypothesis is rejected, then FFR has Granger-caused the member interest rate of the 
Treasury term structure. 
 
While the Wald test can shed insight into the unidirectional nature of FFR with term 
structure, a more robust examination of their long-run relationships can be 
accomplished by employing the Johansen test.  Johansen (1988 and 1996, p.5) 
shows that when the variables have an I(1) process of nonstationarity with stationary 
differences, it is possible to reformulate them into levels and differences to examine 
the possibility of cointegration between or among variables.  Following the vector 
autoregressive model suggested by Johansen (2004, p7), we modify it and use the 
8 We choose n = m = 5 based on the Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
(HQIC), Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the fact that some months have 5 weeks. 
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following equation to examine the degree of cointegration between the FFR and the 
member interest rate of the term structure9: 
 
 
1
1
1
k
t t i t i t t
i
X X X D ε
−
− −
=
∆ = Π + Γ ∆ +Φ +∑       (2) 
 
where Xt is an (n x 1) vector of interest rates; ∆Xt is the first differenced value of Xt; 
Dt is a vector of the deterministic terms;Π , iΓ , and Φ  are the parameter matrices; 
and tε  is the error term that is independently and identically distributed with mean 
zero and variance matrix, Ω. 
 
While Seddighi (2012, p333) shows the decision criteria for detecting cointegration 
that are based on two similar likelihood ratio statistics of the trace and maximum 
Eigenvalues, we choose to use only the trace statistics shown below: 
 
 λtrace(r) = 
1
ln(1 )
m
j
j r
n µ
= +
− −∑         (3) 
 
where r is the rank of theΠ matrix; n is the sample size; m is the maximum number 
of characteristic roots; and μj is the value of the j-th characteristic root.  The 
hypotheses are tested in the following sequence: 
 
 First:  Ho: r = 0 vs.  Ha: r > 1  
  
Second: Ho: r < 1 vs.  Ha: r > 2  
 
q-th:  Ho: r < q -1  vs.  Ha: r = q for  3 < q < m  
 
 
If λtrace(r) is greater than the critical value provided in Johansen (1988), then we 
reject the null hypothesis and test the next hypothesis in the sequence until the first 
non-significant result is obtained.  If we fail to reject the first null hypothesis of r = 
0, for example, we can conclude that the variables are not cointegrated.  Otherwise, 
we may conclude that they are cointegrated.  
 
 
 
 
9 Thalassinos and Politis (2011 and 2012) also adopt a similar model to examine the 
cointegration in international stock markets and oil prices and US dollar. 
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3.2.2 Impact of the Federal Funds Rate and Term Structure on Stock Market 
 
The change in the federal funds rate affects all interest rates, including the Treasury 
term structure.  As the interest rates change, their impact should be felt on the stock 
market because stocks and bonds can be either substitutes or complements for an 
investment purpose.  For example, Gagnon et al. (2011b) describe the role of term 
premium in investors' decision making by referring to Tobin's portfolio-balance 
effect.  That is, holding default risk unchanged, investors will rebalance their 
portfolio mix based on term risk. As investors reshuffle their portfolio mix in debt 
securities, there will be a spillover effect into the stock market.  Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the federal funds rate as a monetary policy tool can be examined via 
the stock market.  We propose to compare the reaction of the S&P500 index and 
VIX volatility index10 to the interest rate changes afforded by the federal funds rate 
changes during the three study periods.  The following regression models are 
estimated where the dependent variables are either the logarithmic value of S&P500 
stock index (SP500) or stock volatility index (VIX) while the independent variables 
are the federal funds rate (FFR) or the member interest rate (R) of the Treasury term 
structure. 
 
1 1 1500t t t tSP FFR Rα β δ ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ +                    (4) 
 
2 2 2t t t tVIX FFR R vα β δ= + ⋅ + ⋅ +       (5) 
 
where iα , iβ  and iδ  are the regression coefficients and tε  and tv  are the standard 
residual terms that are independently and identically distributed with mean zero and 
fixed variance.  In order to eliminate the possible first-order serial autocorrelation 
often present in this type of estimation, we use the method proposed by Newey and 
West (1987). 
 
If the federal funds rate exerts equal influence on the stock market, the sign and 
magnitude of the regression coefficients should be almost the same in all three 
periods.  However, if they are markedly different during the three periods, we may 
be able to detect the different influence and role the federal funds rate played in each 
period. 
 
 
 
10 VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index which 
is also known as fear index or investor fear gauge.  It is calculated from the implied volatility 
of S&P500 stock index options and is believed to provide forward-looking expectations into 
the stock market. 
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4. Results 
 
We provide here below the estimation results for all the equations presented above 
and the interpretation of their results. 
 
4.1 The Wald Test for Granger Causality 
 
Table 4 shows the Wald F-statistics and the p-value obtained from estimating 
Equation (1)11.  Given the p-value of 0 for all the interest rates in the Treasury term 
structure during the pre-GR period, the federal funds rate has Granger-caused the 
term structure.  We also find a very similar result during the GR.  Except the 1-year 
and 3-year maturities, all other interest rates show a p-value of less than 0.05, 
indicating significance at the 5% significance level.  Once again, during the GR, the 
federal funds rate has affected the term structure by having a Granger-causing 
relationship.   However, an opposite case is found during the post-GR period where 
no member of the term structure is significant at the 5% or even at 10% significance 
level.  Because no Granger-causality is found during this period, it is judged that the 
federal funds rate had no influence on the term structure.  This indicates that the zero 
lower bound via the quantitative easing was ineffective and moribund in stimulating 
other interest rates during the post-GR period.   
 
Table 4. Wald F-Statistics for Granger Causality Tests 
of Federal Funds Rates on Treasury Term Structure 
Maturity Pre-GR GR Post-GR  
1 year 18.4 4.54 3.58 
p-value 0 0.47 0.61 
2 years 31.03 12.74 7.02 
p-value 0 0.03 0.22 
3 years 38.17 9.69 5.89 
p-value 0 0.08 0.32 
5 years 41.41 16.67 6.65 
p-value 0 0.01 0.25 
7 years 38.51 16.22 6.15 
p-value 0 0.01 0.29 
10 years 34.95 18.75 6.52 
11 We eliminate from estimation the short-term interest rates with a maturity less than 1 year 
due to their high correlation with the federal funds rate.  
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p-value 0 0 0.26 
20 years 30.37 16.27 7.12 
p-value 0 0.01 0.21 
30 years 26.28 11.5 6.31 
p-value 0 0.04 0.28 
 
4.2 The Johansen Test for Cointegration 
 
Table 5 shows the rank of the cointegration vector and the trace statistics for the 
Treasury term structure, based on Equation (2).  We find that there is cointegration 
of rank 1 or higher between the federal funds rate and each member of the Treasury 
term structure during the pre-GR period.  However, for the post-GR period, none, 
except the 1-year maturity, shows cointegration.  Therefore, the federal funds rate as 
a monetary policy tool during the pre-GR period has influenced the term structure 
but not so during the post-GR period.  This finding supports the results obtained by 
the Wald test for Granger causality.  During the GR, however, we find a different 
result.  During the GR, no cointegration between the federal funds rate and the term 
structure is found via the Johansen test.  In fact, there is a very strong statistical 
support at the 5% significance level that all save the 20-year maturity show a zero 
cointegration.  This finding is in conflict with that of the Wald test.  However, given 
that the zero lower bound came into effect in the twelfth month12 of the GR, it seems 
that the Wald test for Granger causality weighed more on the first eleven months of 
the GR in analyzing the role of the federal funds rate as a monetary policy tool 
whereas the Johansen test for cointegration weighed more on last 7 months of the 
GR when the federal funds rate was near zero. Consequently, the Wald test shows 
the federal funds rate affecting the term structure during the GR but not so according 
to the Johansen test13. 
 
Table 5. Johansen Tests of Cointegration of Federal Funds 
Rates with Treasury Term Structure 
Maturity   Pre-GR GR Post-GR 
1 year Coint Vector 1 0 1 
  Trace Stat  3.60* 11.49* 3.96 
2 years Coint Vector 1 0 0 
  Trace Stat 3.94   9.05*  12.98* 
12 Given that the Great Recession per our study period began in January 2008 and ended in 
June 2009, the start of the ZLB in December 2008 coincides with the twelfth month in the 18 
month-long Great Recession. 
13 This is an interesting but debatable point that needs further examination at another time. 
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3 years Coint Vector 1 0 0 
  Trace Stat 5.51  8.98*  13.00* 
5 years Coint Vector 1 0 0 
  Trace Stat 6.25  9.94*  11.27* 
7 years Coint Vector 1 0 0 
  Trace Stat 7.26  9.93*  11.17* 
10 years Coint Vector 1 0 0 
  Trace Stat 8.54  14.15*  9.74* 
20 years Coint Vector 1 1 0 
  Trace Stat 9.41 5.76  9.68* 
30 years Coint Vector 1 0 0 
  Trace Stat 9.33  13.20*  9.19* 
* indicates significance at the 5% significance level. 
 
4.3. Impact on the Stock Index 
 
As Rigobon and Sack (2004) find that increases in the short-term interest rate have a 
negative impact on stock prices, interest rates do affect stock price.  We estimate 
Equation (4) to examine the impact of the federal funds rate and each interest rate in 
the term structure on the logarithmic values of S&P 500 stock index.  Because of 
this focus, we report in Table 6 only the regression coefficients of the federal funds 
rate, 1β , and term structure, 1δ , and omit the intercept term which captures the fixed 
effect.14   
 
If the federal funds rate and the term structure play the equal and neutral role in the 
stock market, then all the coefficients should exhibit similar sign and magnitude 
during each of the three study periods.   However, the estimated results shown in 
Table 6 do not support this intuition.  The pre-GR and post-GR periods show that 
neither the federal funds rate nor the term structure has affected the stock market 
significantly except when the federal funds rates are combined with the longer term 
interest rates of 10 years or more.  The general tendency of statistically insignificant 
and negative coefficients associated with the federal funds rate and term structure 
observed during these two periods’ weakly supports Rigobon and Sack (2004) who 
concluded a negative relationship exists between the interest rates and S&P 500 
index. This weak negative tendency is completely reversed during the GR. All the 
14 We do not report the values of this intercept term because we wish to focus on the impact 
of FFR and term structure on the stock market. However, all intercept terms show statistical 
significance at the 5% significance level or better.  Upon request, however, the full 
regression information can be disclosed. 
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coefficients are statistically significant and positive, indicating that the decrease in 
the federal funds rate and the term structure observed during the GR did decrease the 
stock market.  Of course, we recognize the endogeneity of interest rates and stock 
prices reacting to the multitude of variables, especially during the rapidly declining 
U.S. financial and economic conditions such as the GR that our study period covers.  
However, this reversal of a normal relationship found only during the GR indicates 
the uniqueness of the GR events associated with the ongoing financial crisis.  In fact, 
the noteworthy positive and statistically significant coefficients observed during the 
GR may indicate a breakdown of a normal negative relationship between interest 
rates and stock prices15.  If so, the federal funds rate as a monetary policy tool did 
influence the stock market in an unconventional way during the GR.  It may have 
signalled and exacerbated the emerging urgency and thus, intensified the decline of 
the stock market.16 
 
Table 6. The Impact of Federal Funds Rate and Treasury Term 
Structure on Logarithmic Values of S&P 500 Stock Index 
Maturity Pre-GR GR Post-GR 
FFR  0.113 0.0993*** 0.385 
t-value (1.71) (3.96) (1.35) 
1 year -0.101* 0.114*** -0.390* 
t-value (-2.60) (3.98) (-2.42) 
FFR 0.0284 0.0980*** 0.285 
t-value (0.48) (5.06) (0.86) 
2 years  -0.057 0.145*** -0.109 
t-value (-1.53) (5.91) (-1.99) 
FFR -0.0097 0.113*** 0.281 
t-value (-0.16) (6.52) (0.8) 
3 years -0.0376 0.137*** -0.066 
t-value (-0.94) (5.85) (-1.77) 
FFR -0.0446 0.119*** 0.34 
t-value (-0.87) (7.5) (0.96) 
5 years -0.0215 0.133*** -0.039 
15 A negative relationship is deemed normal if a decreased yield in bond market forces 
investors to rebalance their portfolio mix by buying into the stock market, driving the stock 
price up. 
16 There is an alternative interpretation: the Fed was following events rather than causing 
them; the market was in free-fall in 2008-09 and the Fed responded to the financial panic 
with policy actions.  Eventually, of course, the market did right itself and begin a long climb 
upward.   
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t-value (-0.47) (5.46) (-1.40) 
FFR -0.0586 0.134*** 0.394 
t-value (-1.31) (8.22) (1.12) 
7 years -0.0126 0.114*** -0.03 
t-value (-0.25) (4.2) (-1.10) 
FFR -0.0691* 0.136*** 0.590 
t-value (-2.04) (8.21) (1.93) 
10 years -0.003 0.113*** -0.004 
t-value (-0.05) (3.49) (-0.15) 
FFR -0.0740** 0.142*** 0.692* 
t-value (-3.04) (8.99) (2.26) 
20 years 0.007 0.119** 0.014 
t-value (0.12) (2.97) (0.15) 
FFR -0.0773**  0.137*** 0.835***  
t-value (-3.61)    (8.6) (3.51) 
30 years 0.018 0.110** 0.063* 
t-value (0.3) (2.98) (2.52) 
*for p<0.05; ** for p<0.01; and *** for p<0.001. 
 
4.4. Impact on Stock Volatility 
 
When the federal funds rate affects the term structure which in turn affects the stock 
price, there is little doubt that these related events will affect the stock market 
volatility.  To examine the impact of the federal funds rate and the term structure on 
stock market volatility, we estimate Equation (5), using the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange's VIX index as a dependent variable and the federal funds rate and each 
member of the term structure as independent variables.  As was the case with Table 
6, Table 7 shows the estimation results for only the regression coefficients of the 
federal funds rate, 2β , and term structure, 2δ , and does not report the intercept 
term17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
17 All intercept terms show statistical significance at the 5% significance level or better. 
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Table 7. The Impact of Federal Funds Rate and Treasury Term 
Structure on Stock Volatility, VIX 
Maturity Pre-GR GR Post-GR 
FFR 2.45 -6.205 11.11 
t-value (0.39) (-1.98) (0.54) 
1 year -8.241** -2.218 5.457 
t-value (-2.66) (-0.51) (0.7) 
FFR -3.026 -3.216 11.92 
t-value (-0.63) (-1.96) (0.49) 
2 years  -5.479* -8.987*** 1.336 
t-value (-2.30) (-3.99) (0.42) 
FFR -6.820 -3.292* 13.16 
t-value (-1.54) (-2.43) (0.51) 
3 years -3.540 -10.54*** 1.034 
t-value (-1.57) (-5.34) (0.46) 
FFR -10.11** -4.535* 9.61 
t-value (-2.79) (-2.51) (0.36) 
5 years -2.02 -8.204** 0.243 
t-value (-0.91) (-2.65) (0.14) 
FFR -11.76*** -5.077** 6.411 
t-value (-3.70) (-2.97) (0.24) 
7 years -0.845 -8.180* -0.199 
t-value (-0.38) (-2.48) (-0.12) 
FFR -13.36*** -6.239** -1.552 
t-value (-4.96) (-2.90) (-0.06) 
10 years 1.135 -4.589 -1.579 
t-value (0.53) (-0.99) (-0.85) 
FFR -14.09*** -5.954** -11.77 
t-value (-5.68) (-3.25) (-0.51) 
20 years 3.608 -7.413 -3.495  
t-value (1.46) (-1.52) (-1.85) 
FFR -14.18*** -4.683** -14.29 
t-value (-5.95) (-3.15)    (-0.76)    
30 years 4.438 -10.25** -6.316** 
t-value (1.87) (-2.94)    (-3.39)    
*for p<0.05; ** for p<0.01; and *** for p<0.001 
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Table 7 reveals a general observation that there is a negative relationship between 
interest rates and VIX.  This is particularly so for the pre-GR and GR periods when 
the federal funds rate and the term structure have a statistically significant and 
negative relationship with VIX.  This indicates that as the federal funds rate and 
term structure decrease, the stock market volatility increases.  When combined with 
the longer maturity of the term structure, the federal funds rate plays a more 
dominant role in impacting VIX than the term structure during the pre-GR period.  
In fact, the interest rates with a maturity of 5 years or more show a statistically 
significant impact on VIX.  On the other hand, during the post-GR period, we 
observe no meaningful relationship between interest rates and VIX given that no 
coefficients are significant except the 30-year maturity.  This indicates that the 
federal funds rate affected the stock market and its volatility during the pre-GR 
period but had no impact during the post-GR period.   However, we find a much 
stronger role is played by all components of the term structure and the federal funds 
rate during the GR where many coefficients associated with the federal funds rate 
and term structure are statistically significant and negative. The absolute magnitude 
of the coefficients with the term structure is larger than that with the federal funds 
rate, except the 1-year and 10-year maturities.  This observation also indicates that 
the impact of the term structure on VIX is larger than that of the federal funds rate 
during the GR.  The stock market volatility reacted to the Treasury term structure 
more than to the federal funds rate.  The post-GR period, however, shows a relative 
calm in that the stock market volatility is not affected by the interest rates except the 
30-year maturity. 
  
Because the three periods under our study represent one of the most challenging 
economic and financial times in the U.S. history, the federal funds rate may not have 
played its normal role as a monetary policy tool.  While using the pre-GR period as 
the norm, we do not find any unusual pattern of behaviour for the post-GR period.  
However, the dominant role played by both the federal funds rate and the member 
rates of the term structure during the GR is noteworthy and may further indicate that 
all segments of the term structure can play a role in determining the stock market 
volatility, not just the main monetary policy tool, and the federal funds rate.  
 
5.     Conclusion 
 
The federal funds rate showed some degree of Granger-causality with the Treasury 
term structure during the pre-GR and GR periods.  Therefore, the federal funds rate 
as a monetary policy tool was effective in affecting other interest rates in the term 
structure during these two periods.  While the same conclusion is possible for the 
pre-GR period under the cointegration examination, the Johansen test does not 
support the existence of cointegration during the GR period.  The post-GR period 
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shows no Granger-causality and no cointegration between the federal funds rate and 
the components of the Treasury term structure.  Therefore, the federal funds rate has 
affected the term structure during the pre-GR period, some during the GR period, 
and none at all during the post-GR period. 
 
The impact of the federal funds rate on the stock index during the pre-GR and post-
GR periods is negative but not supported with the statistical significance.  This 
observation, however, shows that the decrease in the federal funds rate and thus, the 
downward shift in the term structure, generally caused the stock market to increase, 
due possibly to the investors' portfolio rebalancing effort.  As the investors move out 
of the lower-yielding debt instruments and buy into the stock market, the portfolio 
rebalancing effect will create a negative relationship between the interest rate and 
the stock price.  However, this negative relationship has changed into a positive 
relationship during the GR period.  All the coefficients show statistically significant 
and positive magnitude, indicating that the decrease in the federal funds rate and the 
term structure decreased the stock market during the GR.  Consequently, this 
noteworthy positive and statistically significant coefficients observed during the GR 
may indicate a breakdown of a normal negative relationship between interest rates 
and stock prices.  If so, the federal funds rate as a monetary policy tool did not work 
via the portfolio rebalancing channel during the GR.  It may have signalled and 
exacerbated the emerging urgency and thus, intensified the decline of the stock 
market.  
 
When the impact of the federal funds rate on the stock market volatility is evaluated, 
we find a generally negative relationship between interest rates and VIX.  This is 
particularly so for the pre-GR and GR periods, indicating that as the federal funds 
rate and term structure decreased, the stock market volatility increased.  When 
combined with the longer maturity of the term structure, the federal funds rate 
played a more dominant role in impacting VIX than the term structure during the 
pre-GR period.  However, the GR period shows a slightly different story in that the 
interest rates in the term structure have played a more dominant negative role than 
the federal funds rate.  In fact, the absolute magnitude of the coefficients with the 
term structure is larger than that with the federal funds rate, except the 1-year and 
10-year maturities.  This observation also indicates that the impact of the term 
structure on VIX is larger than that of the federal funds rate during the GR.  The 
post-GR period shows a relative calm in that the stock market volatility is not 
affected by the interest rates except the 20-year and 30-year maturities. 
 
Because the three periods under our study represent one of the most challenging 
economic and financial times in the U.S. history, the federal funds rate may have not 
played its normal role as a monetary policy tool.  While using the pre-GR period as 
the norm, we do not find any unusual pattern of behaviour for the post-GR period.  
56 
European Research Studies, XVII (3), 2014 
M.S. Miller, J.W Choi 
 
However, the dominant role played by the component rates of the term structure via 
the federal funds rate during the GR is noteworthy and may further indicate that all 
segments of the term structure can play a role in determining the stock price and 
stock market volatility, not just the federal funds rate. The main policy implication 
of this paper is that even in economically challenging periods such as deep recession 
and financial crisis, the federal funds rate impacts the Treasury term structure which 
in turn influences stock price and its volatility, as long as it does not reach into the 
zero lower bound.   
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